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[So F. No. 19686. In Bank. May 24,1957.] 
THE PEOPLE, Appellant, v. ONE 1953 FORD VICTORIA 
MOTOR B3PV 102617, Defendant; DEAN AND COM-
P ANY (a Corporation), Respondent. 
[1] Poisons-Transportation of Narcotics-Forfeiture of Vehicles. 
-Health & Safe Code, § 11620, relating to protection of in-
terests of lienholders as against forfeiture of vehicles used 
in unlawful transportation of narcotics, does not contemplate 
the forfeiture of the interest of an innocent mortgagee, but 
to prove his innocence a mortgagee whose interest arises out 
of a transaction in this state must show that his mortgage is 
bona fide, that his interest was created without any knowledge 
that the vehicle was to be used unlawfully, and that he made 
the required "reasonable investigation." 
[2] Id.-Transportation of Narcotics-Forfeiture of Vehicles.-
By requiring a "reasonable investigation" by mortgagees or 
conditional vendors to avoid forfeiture of their interests in the 
event of prohibited use of automobiles, Health & Safe Code, 
§ 11620, in effect regulates the conduct of persons financing 
and facilitating sales, and as .applied to persons financing sales 
of automobiles in this state a forfeiture for failure to make 
the required investigation is not unreasonable; but in the 
absence of a plain legislative direction to the contrary, the 
statute cannot reasonably be interpreted as requiring such 
investigation when the sales are financed in other states and 
the vehicles are taken to this state without the knowledge of 
those financing the sales and in violation of express contractual 
[1] See Cal.Jur.2d, Drugs and Druggists, § 58 et seq. 
McK. Dig. Reference: [1-3 Poisons, § 17(4). 
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prohibitions, since a person financing the sale of an auto-
mobile in another state for use exclusively in that state will 
look to the laws of that state for the determination of his 
rights and duties. 
[3] ld.-Transportation of Narcotics-Forfeiture of Vehicles.-
A holding that the "reasonable investigation" required of a 
California mortgagee by Health ti Saf. Code, § 11620, is not 
applicable to a mortgagee of another state will not subvert 
the enforcement of this state's narcotic laws, since the state 
may still forfeit the interest of the wrongdoer, and since the 
Legislature has made plain its purpose not to forfeit the in-
terests of innocent mortgagees. 
APPEAL from portion of a judgment of the Superior Court 
of Monterey County. Stanley Lawson, Judge. Affirmed. 
Proceeding to forfeit an automobile for unlawful trans-
portation of narcotics. Portion of judgment of forfeiture 
recognizing mortgagee's lien on automobile, affirmed. 
Edmund G. Brown, Attorney General, Clarence A. Linn, 
Assistant Attorney General, and Raymond M. Momboisse, 
Deputy Attorney General, for Appel1ant. 
Severson, Davis & Larson, James B. Werson and George 
Brunn for Respondent. 
TRAYNOR, J.-In this proceeding to forfeit an automo-
bile for an unlawful transportation of narcotics (Health & 
Saf. Code, §§ 11610-11629) the facts are undisputed. 
On June 10, 1953, Willie Smith purchased the automobile 
from a dealer in Bexar County, Texas. Smith executed a 
note for the unpaid balance of the purchase price and gave 
the dealer a chattel mortgage on the automobile to secure 
payment. On the same day, the dealer assigned the note and 
mortgage to respondent, a Texas corporation engaged in the 
business of financing the sales of automobiles. 
The mortgage prohibited the mortgagor from removing 
the automobile from Bexar County without the written con-
sent of the mortgagee. In violation of this prohibition and 
without the knowledge of respondent, Smith brought the 
automobile to California. 
On September 23, 1954, Smith used the automobile in 
California to transport marihuana, and the automobile was 
seized. (Health & Saf. Code, § 11611.) On March 1, 1955, 
the attorney general filed a notice of seizure and intended for-
feiture. (Health & Saf. Code, § 11612.) Respondent answered, 
aasertiDg its mortgage. 
) 
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The hearing disclosed that Texas has no law providing for 
the forfeiture of automobiles used in the unlawful transpor-
tation of narcotics; that at the time respondent accepted 
the assignment of the note and mortgage it had no informa-
tion that would place it on notice that the vehicle was to be 
used unlawfully; and that respondent made no investigation 
of Smith's moral responsibility, character, and reputation. 
(See Health & Saf. Code, § 11620, infra.) 
The trial court concluded" [t]hat the validity and effect 
of the lien of ••• [respondent] ... is governed by the laws 
of the State of Texas, which do not require an investigation 
of the moral responsibility, character and reputation of the 
purchaser," and entered judgment providing that the auto-
mobile be forfeited to the state of California subject to re-
spondent's lien for the unpaid balance of the purchase price, 
$722.84. The People appeal from the part of the judgment 
recognizing respondent's lien.-
The validity of respondent's mortgage is not in question. 
Admittedly the mortgage was valid in Texas, and it is valid 
here. (Atha v. Bockius, 39 Ca1.2d 635, 639 [248 P.2d 745].) 
The People contend that despite the validity of the mortgage, 
respondent's interest in the automobile should be forfeited 
because respondent failed to investigate Smith's moral re-
sponsibility, character and reputation. 
Section 11610 of the Health and Safety Code provides: 
4' A vehicle used to unlawfully transport . . . any narcotic 
... shall be forfeited to the State." Section 11620 provides: 
"The claimant .•. may prove his . . . mortgage ... to be 
bona fide and that his ... interest was created after a rea-
sonable investigation of the moral responsibility, character, 
and reputation of the purchaser, and without any knowledge 
that the vehicle was being, or was to be, used for the purpose 
charged .... " Section 11622 provides: "In the event of 
., Assignces of the rcgi'lteredmvner defended against the forfeiture, 
and judgmcnt was elltered against them. They haw not appealed. The 
trial court restrictcd the People's rccovery of costs to the proceeds of 
the sale of the automobile remaining after the payment of respon!lent's 
lien. (Sce Health & Saf. Code, § l1G~5.) The People contend that thC'y 
Rhould have recovered costs generally against the unsuccessful parties 
(scc Code Civ. Proc., § 1032), and that the trial court erred in limiting 
the rceo_ery of costs to tIle proc'crds of the sale of the automobilc. (See 
People v. 01lr. 1950 Ford Sedan, 140 (':11.A pp.~d G-1 i, G49 [295 P.2d 
4SGJ.) Tlle PcoJ,le did not appeal, how('vcr. from the part of the judg-
mcnt pertaining t.o ('ost'!, anu H is settled that on an appeal from a 
scvcrallle pnrt of n jul16"lJlC'nt, other parts of the judgment that have 
not been npnenle<1 fl'on) wHl not h(' ('omlidt'red. (American Enterprise, 
1,",_ v. Van Winkle, 39 Ca1.2d 210, 216 [246 P.2d 935].) 
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such proof, the court shall order the vehicle released to the 
... innocent .•. mortgagee, .•. it being the intention of 
this section to forfeit only the •.. interest of the purchaser. " 
[1] The statute makes it clear that it does not cO,ntemplate 
the forfeiture of the interest of an innd't!ent mortgagee. (People 
v. One 1941 Chevrolet Coupe, 37 Cal.2a 283, 302 [231 P.2d 
832].) To prove his innocence, however, a mortgagee whose 
interest arises out of a transaction in, California must show 
not only that his mortgage is bona fide and that his interest 
was created without any knowledge that the vehicle was to 
be used unlawfully but also that he made the required "rea-
sonable investigation;" Respondent bas proved that its 
mortgage is bona fide; that it was created in another state 
without any knowledge that the vehicle was to be used Un-
lawfully or even that it was to be taken to California; and 
that the automobile was brought here in violation of an ex· 
press contractual prohibition against removing the vehicle 
not only from Texas but from a specified county therein. The 
question is whether under these circumstances the "reasonable 
investigation" required of a California mortgagee to avoid 
forfeiture of his interest applies to respondent. 
[2] By requiring a "reasonable investigation" to avoid 
forfeiture of their interests in the event of prohibited use of 
automobiles, section 11620 in effect regulates, the conduct of 
persons financing, and thereby facilitating, the sales thereof. 
(People v. One 1940 Ford v-a Coupe, 36 Ca1.2d 471, 477 [224 
P.2d 677] ; People v. One 1941 Chevrolet C~)7"-':, supra, 37 
Cal.2d at 302; People v. One 1941 Cadillac Clllv Coupe, 63 
Cal.App.2d 418, 421, 424 [147 P.2a 49].) To avoid forfeiture 
such persons are required to investigate the moral responsi-
bility, character, and reputation of prospective purchasers 
and mortgagors to diminish the possibility that automobiles 
will be placed in the hands of persons likely to use them to 
transport narcotics unlawfully. As applied to persons financ-
ing the sales of automobiles in California, a forfeiture for 
failure to make the required investigation is not unreason-
able. Such persons may reasonably be expected to be familiar 
with California statutes regulating their activities and to 
make the" reasonable investigation" necessary to protect their 
interests from forfeiture. In the absence of a plain legisJati\'e 
direction to the contrary, however, the statute cannot reason· 
ably be interpreted as reqlliring such investigation when the 
sales are financed in other states and the vehicles are taken 
to California, not only without the knowledge of those financ-
ing the sales, but in violation of express contractual prohibi-
) 
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tions. (See Atka v. Bockius, supra, 39 Ca1.2d at 639, 640, 643; 
Mercantile Acceptance Co. v. Frank, 203 Cal. 483, 487, 491 
(265 P. 190, 57 A.L.R. 696] ; North Alaska Salmon Co. v. Pills-
bury, 174 Cal. 1, 4 [162 P. 93, L.R.A. 1917E 642].) A person 
financing the sale of an automobile in Texas for use exclusively 
in that state will look to the laws of Texas for the determina-
tion of his rights and duties. He cannot reasonably be expected 
to familiarize himself with and comply in Texas with the 
statutes of the 48 or more jurisdictions into which the automo-
bile could possibly be taken without his consent and in viola-
tion of express contractual prohibitions. Not only is section 
11620 not made expressly applicable to an innocent mortgagee 
financing the sale of an automobile in another state for exclu-
sive use there, but the statutory enumeration of relationships 
between the mortgagor and the state of California in the 
1955 amendment to that section (Stats. 1955, ch. 1209, § 5), 
plainly indicates that in requiring a "reasonable investiga-
tion" to avoid forfeiture, the Legislature was preoccupied 
with California mortgagors and mortgagees.· 
[3] It is contended that a holding that the "reasonable 
investigation" requirement is not applicable to respondent 
will subvert the enforcement of California '8 narcotics laws. 
We are not persuaded that such dire consequences will ensue. 
The state may still forfeit the interest of the wrongdoer. It 
has done so in this case. Moreover, the Legislature has made 
plain its purpose not to forfeit the interests of innocent mort-
gagees. It has not made plain that" reasonable investigation" 
of the purchaser is such an essential element of innocence 
that it must be made even by an out-of-state mortgagee al-
though such mortgagee could not reasonably be expected 
to make such investigation. 
The judgment is affirmed. 
Gibson, C. J., Shenk, J., Carter, J., Spence, J., and Mc-
Comb, J., concurred. 
SCHAUER, J.-I concur in both the judgment and the 
reasoning upon which it is based, with the qualification that 
·That amendment provides that if certain other circumstances are 
shown, a "reasonable investigation" shall be deemed to have been 
made if the mortgagee ascertained that: "(a) The ... mortgagor was 
... the holder of any occupational or business license issued by the 
Rtate of California, or (b) ... an employee with tenure of the .•• 
~tate of California or of any political subdivision thereof 01 of any 
municipal corporation, or .(e) ... a commissioned or noncommissioned 
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I do not join in any implication, if there be such, that Cali .. 
fornia could constitutionally (by "a plain legislative direc-
tion," or otherwise) require as a condition of upholding con~ 
tracts made in other states by residents of those states that 
the parties to such contracts comply with California's "rea-
sonable investigation" statute. 
Appellant's petition for a rehearing was denied June 19, 
1957. 
